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Abstract
Empirical studies support the hysteresis hypothesis that recessions
have a permanent e¤ect on the level of output. We analyze the impli-
cations of hysteresis for scal policy in a DSGE model. We assume a
simple learning-by-doing mechanism where demand-driven changes in
employment can a¤ect the level of productivity permanently, leading
to hysteresis in output. We show that the scal output multiplier is
much larger in the presence of hysteresis and that the welfare mul-
tiplier of scal policythe consumption equivalent change in welfare
for one dollar change in public spendingis positive (negative) in the
presence (absence) of hysteresis. The main benet of accommodative
scal policy in the presence of hysteresis is to diminish the damage of
a recession to the long-term level of productivity and, thus, output.
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1 Introduction
The hysteresis hypothesis that recessions have a permanent e¤ect on the level
of output is supported by several empirical studies. Ball (2014) estimates the
long-term e¤ects of the global recession of 2008-2009 on potential output in
23 countries. He nds that most countries su¤ered from a hysteresis e¤ect, as
deviations of actual output from pre-recession trends lowered potential out-
put substantially. Blanchard et al. (2015) analyze the e¤ects of recessions
over the past 50 years in 23 countries and nd that roughly two-thirds of the
countries su¤ered from hysteresis. After recessions, actual output remains
low relative to pre-recession trends, even after the economy has recovered.
Fatas and Summers (2016a) nd empirical support for the presence of strong
hysteresis e¤ects of scal policy. Fiscal consolidations after the Great Re-
cession have not only caused a temporary loss in output but also permanent
damage to potential output.
Summers (2015) criticizes dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models and New Keynesian macroeconomics because they ignore hysteresis.
He points out that in New Keynesian models, stabilization policy cannot af-
fect the average level of output over time; it can a¤ect only the amplitude of
economic uctuations. He argues that stabilization policy is not as essential if
it cannot a¤ect the average level of output over time. According to him, the
study of stabilization policy without hysteresis "essentially abstracts away
from most of what is important in macroeconomics." The Chair of the Fed-
eral Reserve System Janet Yellen (2016) notes that "hysteresis e¤ectsand
the possibility they might be reversedcould have important implications for
the conduct of monetary and scal policy."
Motivated by the empirical results, the criticisms of Summers (2015), and
the observations of Yellen (2016), we analyze the consequences of hysteresis
for scal policy in a DSGE model.1 Traditionally, modeling hysteresis re-
lies on the labor market. Blanchard and Summers (1986) argue that a rise
in cyclical unemployment increases long-term unemployment or unemployed
workers may experience a fall in their skills, leading to a persistent or even
a permanent fall in employment and output. Fatas and Summers (2016b)
argue that one should think about a broader concept of hysteresis that al-
lows a temporary downturn to a¤ect productivity and capital accumulation
dynamics, thereby creating a much stronger connection between recessions
and long-term output.
Reifschneider et al. (2015) nd that the Great Recession caused notable
1Gali (2015), Kienzler and Schmid (2014), and Reifschneider at al. (2015), for instance,
study the implications of hysteresis for monetary policy.
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damage to the U.S. economys supply side, with weak demand causing a
signicant portion of it. Their estimates suggest that the largest contribution
to the recent (2008-2013) slowdown in potential output growth was from
growth in labor productivity, reecting a decline in capital accumulation
and slower growth in total factor productivity (TFP). Trend growth in labor
input has also slowed, reecting less rapid population growth and a modest
increase in the natural rate of unemployment. However, the latter accounts
for only 13% of the cumulative post-Great Recession shortfall in potential
output, while the rest is explained by the damage of the Great Recession to
productivity.
Anzoategui et al. (2016) study the view that the productivity slowdown
after the Great Recession was an endogenous response to a reduction in
demand. They develop a New Keynesian DSGE model with endogenous
TFP that allows for the costly development and adoption of new technolo-
gies. They nd that, in the recent productivity slowdown, TFP declined
by roughly 5 percentage points relative to the trend. The endogenous com-
ponent explains 4.75 percentage points of the slowdown and most of the 7
percentage points decline in labor productivity.
The ndings of Anzoategui et al. (2016) suggest that endogenous changes
in TFP caused by a fall in demand is the most important factor of hystere-
sis. To model endogenous changes in TFP, we add a very simple learning-
by-doing mechanism into the production function, following the formulation
of Tervala (2013), based on the idea of Chang et al. (2002).2 They assume
skill accumulation through past work experience, such that the current labor
supply a¤ects future productivity. We assume, unlike Chang et al. (2002)
and Tervala (2013), that uctuations in employment can a¤ect TFP per-
manently. We use a two-country model in order to have an external and
entirely demand-driven source for a recession and assume that a foreign time
preference shock drives the domestic economy into a recession.
A common argument against accommodative scal policy is that (short-
term) scal output multipliers are low. Our rst main nding is that the in-
troduction of hysteresis raises the net present value scal multiplier (NVPM),
the sum of output over a certain time horizon discounted at the steady state
interest rate divided by public spending calculated in the same way, from
0.5 to 3 under the benchmark parameterization. The main benet of scal
policy in the presence of hysteresis is to limit, by reducing the depth of a re-
cession, the damage of a recession to the long-term level of productivity and,
2Chang et al. (2002) shows the learning-by-doing mechanism improves the DSGE
models ability to t the dynamics of aggregate output and hours. Tervala (2013) examines
the consequences of persistent changes in productivity on the international transmission
of monetary policy.
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thus, output. Consequently the NVPM is very large, even if the short-term
(cumulative) output multiplier is somewhat below one.
The most directly related paper is Rendahl (2016), who analyzes the e¢ -
cacy of scal policy in a liquidity trap in a model with persistent hysteresis-
like movements in the unemployment rate. In his model, scal expansion
lowers the unemployment rate both in the present and in the future. Con-
sequently, the inuence of demand on aggregate supply increases the scal
multiplier, which he nds to be in the range of 0.8 to 1.8. Our results are in
line with Rendahl (2016); however, the inuence of demand on aggregate sup-
ply through productivity seems to increase the e¢ cacy of scal policy much
more. Moreover, our results do not rely on the liquidity trap environment.
Another argument against accommodative scal policy is to say that it
does not necessarily increase welfare, even when scal output multipliers are
large (see e.g. Bilbiie et al. 2014 andMankiw andWeinzierl 2011). Motivated
by this, we investigate the welfare multiplier of scal policy, dened as the
consumption equivalent change in welfare for one dollar change in public
spending. Our second main nding is that in the absence of hysteresis, the
welfare multiplier of scal policy is negative; hysteresis, however, makes it
positive. The welfare multiplier with hysteresis is 1.1, even when public
spending does not provide direct utility to households. So one dollar spent
by the government raises domestic welfare by the equivalent of 1.1 dollars of
private consumption. The reason for the positive welfare multiplier is that
countercyclical scal policy diminishes the damage of a recession to the long-
term level of private consumption. When the weight of public consumption
relative to private consumption is 0.4, the welfare multiplier is 1.5.
Rendahl (2016) nds that the welfare multiplier is at most 0.7, when
public spending is pure waste. He also nds that if the duration of a rise
in public spending is short, relative to the duration of the liquidity trap,
welfare multipliers turn negative. In our case, where the inuence of demand
on aggregate supply is modelled through productivity, welfare multipliers are
positive. In addition, welfare multipliers are the highest for short-lived scal
expansions, because they limitby reducing the depth of a recession at the
right timethe damage to productivity the most e¤ectively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model. Section 3 discusses the parameterization of the model. Section 4
studies the output and welfare multipliers of scal policy. Section 5 concludes
and discusses the policy implications of hysteresis.
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2 Model
We use a New Keynesian open-economy model with two countries: home and
foreign. The size of the world population is normalized to 1 and a continuum
of rms and households are indexed by z 2 [0; 1]. A fraction n (1   n) of
them are domestic (foreign).
2.1 Households
2.1.1 Preferences
All households have identical preferences. The intertemporal utility function
of the representative domestic household is (if equations are symmetric across
countries we present only domestic equations)
Ut (z) = Et
1X
s=t
s tTPs
"
logCs   (`s (z))
1 + 1
'
1+ 1
'
+  logGs
#
; (1)
where E is the expectation operator,  is the discount factor, TPt is a time
preference shock that a¤ects the intertemporal substitution of households,
Ct is a private consumption index, `t(z) is the labor supply, ' is the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply, Gt is a public consumption index, and  is the
weight of public consumption relative to private consumption. The private
consumption index is given by
Ct =
h
(n)
1
 (Cht )
 1
 + (1  n) 1 (Cft )
 1

i 
 1
; (2)
where Cht and C
f
t , respectively, are indexes of domestic and foreign goods,
n (0 < n < 1) is the share of domestic goods in the consumption basket
( > 1 captures the degree of home bias in consumption) and  > 0 measures
the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods (the cross-
country substitutability, for short).3 The public consumption indexes are
identical to the private consumption ones.
The consumption indexes of the di¤erent types of domestic Cht and foreign
goods Cft are given by
Cht =
24n  1 nZ
0
(cht (z))
 1
 dz
35  1 ; Cft =
24(1  n)  1 1Z
n
(cft (z))
 1
 dz
35

 1
;
3The foreign consumption index is Ct =
h
(n)
1
 (Cht )
 1
 + (1  n) 1 (Cft )
 1

i 
 1
;
asterisks show consumption by the foreign household. Home bias in consumption requires
 < 1.
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where cht (z) (c
f
t (z)) is the consumption of di¤erentiated domestic (foreign)
good z by the domestic household and  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
between goods produced in the same country (the within-country substi-
tutability, for short).
The private demand functions for the di¤erentiated domestic and foreign
goods by domestic and foreign households are (the demand functions by
governments are dened in an analogous way)
cht (z) =

pht (z)
P ht
  
P ht
Pt
 
Ct;
cft (z) =
"
pft (z)
P ft
#  "
P ft
Pt
#  
1  n
1  n

Ct;
cht (z) =

pht (z)
P ht
  
P ht
P t
 
Ct ;
cft (z) =
"
pft (z)
P ft
#  "
P ft
P t
#  
1  n
1  n

Ct :
pht (z) and p
f
t (z) show, respectively, the domestic currency price of domestic
and foreign goods. P ht and P
f
t are the price indexes that correspond to
domestic and foreign aggregate consumption baskets Cht and C
f
t . All price
indexes are expressed in local currency terms, and foreign currency price
indexes are denoted with an asterisk. For instance, the foreign currency
price of a domestic good is pht .
The domestic price indexes are as follows:
P ht =

n 1
Z n
0
pht (z)
1  dz
 1
1 
; P ft =

(1  n) 1
Z 1
n
pft (z)
1  dz
 1
1 
Pt =
h
n(P ht )
1  + (1  n)(P ft )1 
i 1
1 
: (3)
2.1.2 Budget Constraint
The budget constraint of the domestic household, in nominal terms, is given
by
Dt = (1 + it)Dt 1 + wt`t   PtCt + t   PtTt: (4)
Dt is nominal bonds, which pays one domestic currency in period t+ 1, held
at the beginning of period t, it is the nominal interest rate on bonds between
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t   1 and t, wt is the nominal wage, t is the nominal prots/dividends of
domestic rms, and Tt is lump-sum taxes.
The domestic bond is the only internationally traded asset. The global
asset market-clearing condition for domestic bonds is nDt + (1  n)Dt = 0.
The foreign bond (F ) that denominated in the foreign currency can be held
only by the foreign household. Because the foreign country has only the
representative household, the net supply of them is zero.
The budget constraint of the foreign household is
Dt
St
+ F t = (1 + it 1)
Dt 1
St
+ (1 + it )F

t 1 + w

t `

t   P t Ct + t   P t T t : (5)
As in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) and Bergin (2006), we assume a
risk premium for the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) that depends on
the countrys net external debt level. The risk premium forces the debt to
converge back to zero in the long term. The interest parity condition with a
risk premium is given by
(1 + it) = (1 + i

t )
St+1
St
+  (exp(Dt)  1); (6)
where  (exp(Dt)  1) is the risk premium.
The households optimality conditions are:
(1 + it)Et

TPt+1PtCt
TPt Pt+1Ct+1

= 1; (7)
`t(z) =

wt
CtPt

: (8)
Equation (7) is the Euler equation for optimal consumption. Equation (8)
governs the labor supply.
2.2 Firms
2.2.1 Productivity and Prots
Martin et al. (2015) show that severe recessions have sizable e¤ects on the
level of output relative to pre-recession trend and that even normal reces-
sions have permanent, but smaller, e¤ects. They also shows that after nor-
mal recessions, the employment rate and total hours worked return to their
pre-recession trends, whereas labor productivity (they do not analyze TFP)
shows a highly persistent or even permanent fall. It does not show any signs,
6 years after the start of the recession, that it would start to converge back
7
to its pre-recession trend. In addition, Anzoategui et al. (2016, 29) nd,
as mentioned in the introduction, that endogenous changes in TFP explain
most of the drop in labor productivity during and after the Great Recession.
Motivated by these ndings, we focus exclusively on hysteresis caused by
endogenous changes in TFP andin order to keep the model as simple as
possibleignore capital deepening and hysteresis in employment. Our way of
modelling the inuence of demand on aggregate supply only through TFP
yields a realistic extent of hysteresis, as shown later in this paper.
All rms produce a di¤erentiated good. The production function is given
by
yt (z) = at(z)`t (z) ; (9)
where yt (z) is the total output of rm z, at(z) is the level of TFP and `t (z)
is the labor input used by the rm. The production function without capital
and constant returns to labor imply that labor productivity is simply the
level of TFP (yt(z)=`t(z) = at(z)`t (z) =`t = at(z)).
We use a very simple way of modeling hysteresis that can be easily in-
corporated into DSGE models. Chang et al. (2002) assume a simple skill
accumulation mechanism through learning by doing, in which the skill level
accumulates over time depending on past employment and that the skill
level raises the e¤ective unit of labor supplied by the household. Following
this idea, Tervala (2013) assumes that the level of productivity accumulates
over time according to past employment. As in Tervala (2013), the level of
productivity evolves according to the following log-linear equation:
a^t(z) = a^t 1(z) + ^`t 1 (z) ; (10)
where 0    1 and  are parameters. Percentage changes from the initial
steady state are denoted by hats (for instance, a^t = dat=a0, where the sub-
script zero denotes the initial steady state). Equation (10) highlights that a
change in the current labor supply changes the level of productivity in the
next period, with an elasticity of . The change in the level of productivity
may not be permanent, because the level of productivity depreciates over
time at the rate of 1  . If  = 1, then the level of productivity shifts per-
manently when employment changes. In this case, temporary shocks have a
permanent e¤ect on the equilibrium level of output, meeting the requirement
for hysteresis. If  < 1, then temporary shocks have a persistent, but not
permanent, e¤ect on the level of productivity and output.
Reifschneider et al. (2015) use a quite similar way of modelling hysteresis,
as they assume that TFP today depends on its value in the previous period
and the di¤erence between the natural rate of unemployment and the actual
rate of unemployment in the previous period.
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Figure 1 on page 31, which shows U.S. TFP and GDP in 2000-2015,
indicates some support for our view. TFP fell during the Great Recession.
In addition, the U.S. GDP and TFP do not show signs that they would have
started to converge back to their pre-recession trends.
The domestic rm maximizes prots
t (z) = p
h
t (z) y
d
t (z)  wt`t (z) ; (11)
taking account the production function (9) and the demand curve for its
products
ydt (z) =

pht (z)
P ht
  
P ht
Pt
 
n(Ct+Gt)+

pht (z)
StP ht
  
StP
h
t
StP t
 
(1 n)(Ct +Gt ):
2.2.2 Price Setting
Under exible prices, the domestic rm maximizes prots, equation (11),
with respect to pht (z). The solution is
pht (z) =

   1
wt
at(z)
: (12)
Following Calvo (1983), each rm may reset its price only with a proba-
bility of 1   in any given period, independent of the time passed since the
last price adjustment. The domestic rm seeks to maximize the discounted
present value of expected real prots
max
pht (z)
Vt (z) = Et
1X
s=t
s tQt;s
s (z)
Ps
;
where t;s is a stochastic discount factor between periods t and s. The solu-
tion is
pht (z) =

   1
Et
P1
s=t 
s tt;sQs
ws
as(z)
Et
P1
s=t 
s tt;sQs
; (13)
where
Qs =

1
P hs
  
P hs
Ps
 
n

Cs +Gs
Ps

+

1
SsP hs
  
P hs
SsP s
 
(1 n)

Cs +G

s
Ps

:
The log-linear version of equation (13) is a handy way to interpret it
p^ht (z) = Etp^
h
t+1(z) + (1  )(w^t   a^t(z)):
The change in the optimal price is the weighted average of the changes in
current and future nominal marginal costs. A fall in the level of productivity
raises the optimal price.
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2.3 Fiscal and Monetary Policy
We assume the simplest possible way to model public spending: taxes are
non-distortionary, as in Rendahl (2016), and the government budget is bal-
anced. The government budget constraint, in per-capita and real terms, is
expressed as
Tt = Gt: (14)
We assume that public spending follows an exogenous AR (1) process
G^t = 
GG^t 1 + "Gt ;
where G 2 [0; 1] and "Gt is a white-noise process with zero mean that repre-
sents an unanticipated change in public spending.
Furman (2016) highlights that a decade ago the common view among
economists was that discretionary scal policy is dominated by monetary
policy as a stabilization tool. He adds that the new view of scal policy is
that scal policy is a benecial complement to monetary policy in case where
low interest rates limit conventional monetary policy. DeLong and Summers
(2012) nd that even a small amount of hysteresis makes expansionary scal
policy very benecial and even likely to be self-nancing at the zero lower
bound. Our intention is to analyze whether hysteresis, which seems to also be
relevant in normal recessions, renders accommodative scal policy benecial
also outside the zero lower bound. Therefore, the central bank does not face
the zero lower bound.
The use of the standard Taylor rule implies that the model must be
stationary. Hysteresis conforms to non-stationarity. Therefore, we assume a
pure ination targeting rule. The central bank adjusts the interest rate in
response to the deviations of ination from the zero ination target, according
to a log-linear interest rate rule with interest rate smoothing:
{^t = (1  1)2P^t + 1{^t 1;
where coe¢ cients 1 and 2 are non-negative, and  is the rst di¤erence
operator.
2.4 Symmetric Equilibrium
The consolidated budget constraint of the home economy is derived with
equations (4), (11) and (14)4
Dt   (1 + it)Dt 1 = pht (z) yt (z)  PtCt:
4The foreign equation is n1 n
Dt
St
  (1 + it) n1 n
Dt 1
St
= pft (z) y

t (z)  P t Ct .
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We log-linearize the model around a symmetric steady state where initial
net foreign assets are zero. For simplicity, public spending is zero in the
initial steady state and the initial level of productivity is normalized to one.
Equations (8), (9) and (12) imply that the initial level of employment is given
by
`0(z) = y0 = C0 =

   1

 1
1+ 1
:
Equilibrium is a sequence of variables that clear the goods and labor
markets in both countries every period, while satisfying pricing rules and
intertemporal budget constraints.
3 Parameter Values
Table 1 shows the baseline values for the parameters. Periods represent
quarters and the discount factor () is set to 0.99. The relative size of
the home country (n) is set to 0.5. The home bias parameter in domestic
consumption () is set to 1.5. This implies that the import-to-GDP ratio
(1   n) is equal to 0.25. This matches with the average import-to-GDP
ratio in the OECD countries (World Bank 2016). We assume that the ratio
is identical in both countries, consequently is set to 0.5.
Peterman (2016) highlights that the Frisch elasticity of labor supply (') is
a key parameter in macro models used to analyze scal policy. It is often set
close to 1 in macro models. Chetty et al. (2013), however, claim that in macro
models the Frisch elasticity on the intensive margin should be set to 0.5. We
follow the advice and set the Frisch elasticity to 0.5. Our choice is inuenced
by the fact that with this parameter value the size of the cumulative scal
multipliers are consistent with the empirical evidence.
The baseline value of the weight of public consumption to relative private
consumption () is set to 0.4, following Song et al. (2012). They argue
that the parameter measures the e¢ ciency in the provision of public goods.
Since the welfare multipliers of scal policy are sensitive to changes in this
parameter value, we vary it in the 0 to 1 range.
The within-country substitutability () is set to 9, as in Gali (2015b).
The cross-country substitutability () is set to 1.5. This value is a widely
used in international macroeconomics and is consistent with Dong (2012).
The risk premium parameter in UIP ( ) is set to 0.004, based on Bergin
(2006). We set the price rigidity parameter () to 0.75, which is in line with
the estimates of Rabanal and Tuesta (2010). Coe¢ cients for the monetary
policy rule are standard: the degree of interest smoothing (1) is set to 0.79,
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based on Clarida et al. (2000) and the ination coe¢ cient is set to 1.5, based
on Taylor (1993).
We assume that a time preference shock follows an AR (1) process
^TPt = 
TP ^t 1 + "^
TP
t :
The persistence of a time preference shock (TP ) is set to 0.75, as in Boden-
stein et al. (2009). We set the size of a foreign preference shock ("^TP ), which
drives economies into recessions, to -5. This causes roughly a one percent
fall in domestic output relative to the initial steady state.
Table 1: Baseline parameterization
Parameter Description Value Reference
 Discount factor 0.99
n Relative size of Home 0.5
 Home bias parameter 1.5 World Bank (2016)
 Home bias parameter 0.5 World Bank (2016)
' Frisch elasticity 0.5 Chetty et al. (2013)
 Weight of public consumption 0.4 Song et al. (2012)
 Within-country substitutability 9 Gali (2015)
 Cross-country substitutability 1.5 Dong et al. (2012)
 Risk premium parameter 0.004 Bergin (2006)
 Price rigidity 0.75 Rabanal/Tuesta (2010)
1 Interest rate smoothing 0.79 Clarida et al. (2000)
2 Ination coe¢ cient 1.5 Taylor (1993)
TP Persistency of preference shock 0.75 Bodenstein et al. (2009)
"^TP Foreign time preference shock -5
G Persistency of scal shock 0.75 Iwata (2013)
 Persistency of productivity 0.99
 Elasticity of productivity 0.11 Chang et al. (2002)
The persistence of scal shocks (G) is set to 0.75, based on the ndings
of Iwata (2013). We assume that the size of a domestic scal shock ("^Gt ) is
0.5% of initial GDP.
Our aim is to analyze the macroeconomic e¤ects of scal policy during
recessions and, consequently, we set the persistence of the changes in the
level of productivity () such that recessions have hysteresis or hysteresis-
like e¤ects on productivity and, thus, output. As discussed in Section 2.2.1,
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hysteresis requires that  is one. We, however, set  to 0.99. This generates
a hysteresis-like response of productivity, but it, and the economy, eventually
converge back to the initial steady state. Reifschneider et al. (2015) use the
same approach and argue that although deep recessions can have a persis-
tent e¤ect on labor supply, they do not change fundamental determinants of
longer-term conditions in the labor market. The same can be argued about
productivity.
A key parameter is the elasticity of productivity with respect to employ-
ment (), as it a¤ects the extent of hysteresis. Chang et al. (2002) nd the
value of 0.11, which we use. DeLong and Summers (2012) examine the lim-
ited evidence on the extent of hysteresis and argue that the plausible range of
their hysteresis parametera proportional reduction in potential output from
a temporary downturnis between zero and 0.2. In our model, the propor-
tional reduction in output in the 20th period, when a foreign time preference
shock has, in practice, died away and prices have adjusted, to rst-period
output is 0.085 in the home country. Rawdanowicz et al. (2014) analyze em-
pirically the hysteresis parameterthe e¤ect of one percentage point of the
negative output gap on reducing potential outputand nd a value of 0.1 for
the U.S. and 0.3 for the euro area. In our model, the ratio of the reduction
in output in the 20th period to the rst period output gap, dened as the
deviation of output from the level that prevails in the case of exible prices,
is 0.146 in the home country. So the parameterization generates a realistic
extent of hysteresis.7
4 Fiscal Policy in a Recession
4.1 Output and Welfare Multipliers
The main contribution of our paper is to analyze the consequences of hystere-
sis for the output and welfare multipliers of scal policy. Empirical studies
often measure the e¤ectiveness of scal policy as the cumulative output mul-
tiplier (CM), which is dened as the cumulative change of output over the
cumulative change of scal policy (see eg. Gechert and Rannenberg (2014)):
CM =
P
h dYt+h=
P
h dGt+h. In our model, a foreign time preference shock
drives the home economy into a recession and we analyze the adjustment of
two economies with and without expansionary domestic scal policy. The
cumulative output multiplier is calculated as the di¤erence of the cumula-
5The average in cases with and without scal expansion.
6The average in cases with and without scal expansion.
7We run the model using the algorithm of Klein (2000) and McCallum (2001).
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tive change in output in case with scal expansion (denoted by superscript
FE) and without scal expansion (denoted by superscript WFE), over the
cumulative change of scal policy:
CM =
P
h Y^
FE
t+h  
P
h Y^
WFE
t+hP
h G^
FE
t+h
:
Several theoretical studies, following the work of Uhlig (2010), calculate
the net present value scal multiplier (NPVM), which is the sum of output
over a certain time horizon discounted at the steady state interest rate divided
by public spending calculated in the same way. In our case NPVM is
NPVM =
hP
s=t
s tY^ FEs  
hP
s=t
s tY^ WFEs
hP
s=t
s tG^FEs
:
Sims and Wol¤ (2014) and Rendahl (2016) dene the welfare multiplier
of scal policy as the change in aggregate welfarein consumption equiva-
lent termsfor a one unit change in public spending. Following the idea of
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007), we rst calculate the welfare e¤ect of scal
policy as a percentage of consumption that households are willing to pay for
policy Anow the scal expansion caseto remain as well o¤ in the policy A
case as in case of alternative policy Bnow the case without scal expansion.
Second, then we divide this by the change in public spending.
Let UWFEt denote welfare in case without scal expansion, and let
fCWFEs ; GWFEs ; `WFEs (z)g1s=t denote the associated private and public con-
sumption and labor supply paths:8
UWFEt (z) = Et
1X
s=t
s t
"
logCWFEs  
(`WFEs (z))
1 + 1
'
1+ 1
'
+  logGWFEs
#
:
The welfare benet of scal expansion relative to the case without scal
expansion, denoted by t, is measured as the fraction of initial consumption
that the domestic household would be willing to payassuming that labor
supply is held constantto be as well o¤ in the scal expansion case as in
the case without scal expansion. Let UFEt be the welfare obtained in case
8The calculation of the welfare multiplier is partly based on Ganelli and Tervala (2016).
There are no time preference shocks in the home country. Therefore, we can normalize 
to one in the welfare calculus.
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without scal expansion. It can be written using the denition of t as
follows:
UFEt = Et
1X
s=t
s t
"
log((1 + t)C
WFE
s ) 
(`WFEs (z))
1 + 1
'
1+ 1
'
+  logGWFEs
#
=
1
1   log(1 + t) + U
WFE
t :
Solving for t and multiplying the equation with 100 to express the welfare
benet as the percentage of consumption we obtain
t = 100 [exp(1  )(UFEt   UWFEt )  1]: (15)
Substituting the rst-order approximations of the utility function to (15)
yields
t = 100 [exp((1  )(
1X
s=t
s t(C^FEs   (`0(z))1+1= ^`FEs + G^FEs )
 (
1X
s=t
s t(C^WFEs   (`0(z))1+1= ^`WFEs + G^WFEs )))  1]: (16)
Equation (16) shows that the welfare benet of scal expansion is the sum
of welfare benets relative to the case without scal expansion discounted at
the steady state interest rate. The welfare multiplier (WM) is the welfare
benet divided by public spending discounted in the same way:
WMt =
t
hP
s=t
s tG^s
: (17)
Equation (17) measures the consumption equivalent change in welfare for one
dollar change public spending.
4.2 Transmission of Shocks without Hysteresis
Figure 2 on page 31 plots the dynamic e¤ects of a foreign time preference
shock on key variables in cases without hysteresis ( =  = 0). The horizon-
tal axes show time and the vertical axes typically show percentage deviations
from the initial steady state. The response of ination is is expressed as per-
centage point deviations in annual terms. In addition, the di¤erence between
the response of domestic consumption in cases without scal expansion and
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with scal expansion would be hard to see. Therefore, Figure 1(b) shows the
di¤erence between the response of domestic consumption in cases without
scal expansion and with scal expansion (C^WFEt   C^FEt ). The consumer
price index based real exchange rate, shown in Figure 2(g), is StP t =Pt. The
domestic terms of trade, plotted in Figure 2(h), is dened as the ratio of do-
mestic export prices to domestic import prices. Changes in bond holdings of
domestic households and public spending, whose initial values are zero, are
expressed as percent deviations from initial steady state (SS) output. The
solid lines depict the case without scal expansion, while the dashed lines
depict the case in which domestic public spending is increased by 0.5% of
initial output.
A strong foreign time preference shock causes a reduction in foreign con-
sumption and labor supply, and thus a¤ecting aggregate demand negatively.
These induce a severe recession in the foreign country. Foreign demand for
domestic goods falls and the home country experiences an export-driven re-
cession. A recession in both countries induces deation. However, the reces-
sion is deeper in the foreign country and, consequently, deation is stronger
in the foreign country. Therefore, the real exchange rate of the home country
appreciates, as shown in Figure 2(g).
An increase in the relative supply of domestic goods causes an improve-
ment in the domestic terms of trade. This increases domestic consumption.
A decrease in the foreign bond holdings of domestic households causes a
negative wealth e¤ect on labor supply and an increase in long-term output.
Table 2 shows the output and welfare multipliers of scal policy. The
cumulative output multiplier is calculated using 16 quarters. NPVM and
the welfare multiplier are calculated using 2,000 periods. As mentioned, our
baseline value for the weight of public consumption to relative private con-
sumption is 0.4. However, Table 2 shows the welfare multipliers in alternative
cases in which  = 0 and  = 1.
Table 2: Output and Welfare Multipliers
Cumul. Net present Welfare multiplier
multiplier value multipl.  = 0  = 0:4  = 1
Without hysteresis
0.4 0.5 -1 -0.6 -0.01
With hysteresis
0.9 2.9 1.1 1.5 2.0
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Figure 2(a) illustrates that a domestic public spending shock causes an
increase in domestic output relative to the case without scal expansion.
Table 2 shows that the cumulative output multiplier is 0.4 and the net present
value scal multiplier is somewhat larger (0.5). Gechert and Rannenberg
(2014) carry out a meta-analysis on scal multipliers based on 98 empirical
studies and nd that the cumulative multipliers of public spending are in
the range of 0.4 to 0.7. Ramey and Zubairy (2016) nd that the cumulative
multipliers at the four-year horizon "are below unity," but most estimates
are in the range of 0.3 to 0.8. Our result is line with these empirical ndings.
The welfare multiplier in the baseline case is -0.6: A one dollar increase
in domestic public spending yields the welfare loss that corresponds to a 0.6
dollars fall in domestic private consumption, i.e. domestic households are
willing to pay 0.6 dollars to avoid a one dollar rise in public spending. An
increase in public consumption increases welfare. This is, however, more
than o¤set by negative e¤ects. Figure 2(b) shows that private consumption
falls because of higher taxes, relative to the case without scal expansion. In
addition, a rise in public spending increases labor supply, relative to the case
without scal expansion. Table 2 shows that the welfare multiplier becomes
practically zero when public consumption yields as much utility as private
consumption ( = 1).
In the absence of hysteresis, our model is very similar to Ganelli and
Tervala (2016), who nd that a rise in public consumption spending reduces
welfare, unless the weight of public consumption is larger than the weight
of private consumption in the utility function. Our welfare results are fully
consistent with their ndings.
4.3 Transmission of Shocks with Hysteresis
Figure 3 on page 32 displays the responses of the main variables to a foreign
time preference shock in the presence of hysteresis ( = 0:11 and  = 0:99).
It does not show ination, but they behave similar to the previous case.
Instead Panels (e) and (f) of Figure 3 show the changes in TFP.
A foreign time preference shock causes a recession in both countries. A
fall in employment induces a deterioration in the level of productivity, shown
in Figures 2(e) and 2(f). The ratio of the peak deviation in productivity
from the initial steady state to the peak deviation in output is 0.24 (a one
percent fall in output causes a 0.24% fall in productivity).9 According to
Conference Board (2016) data and our calculations on projections for GDP
and productivity, shown in Figure 1, the ratio of the deviation of actual
9In comparison, in Reifschneider et al. (2015) the ratio is roughly 0.1.
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productivity from pre-recession trend to the deviation of actual output from
pre-recession trend in the U.S. in 2009 was 0.26.10 This suggests that the
basic parameterization generates a realistic relationship between recessions
and productivity.
A decline in productivity implies that the fall in domestic and foreign
output in the presence of hysteresis is much more persistent than in the
absence of hysteresis. The solid line of Figure 3(a) shows that without scal
expansion, domestic output in the 20th period remains much below the initial
level, even if the foreign shock has died away and the negative wealth e¤ect
tends to increase labor supply. A temporary demand-driven recession, which
causes a fall in employment, deteriorates the equilibrium level of output by
causing a fall in productivity. For the sake of comparison, in the absence of
hysteresis and scal expansion, domestic output is above the initial level in
the 20th period due to the negative wealth e¤ect on the labor supply.
Figure 3(a) shows that in the case with scal expansion, the fall in domes-
tic output is smaller. In the short term, scal expansion stimulates demand,
but the benets of scal expansion last much longer than the demand ef-
fect. In the case with scal expansion, a fall in employment is smaller and,
consequently, the level of productivity deteriorates less, as shown in Figure
3(e). Thus the e¤ect of scal expansion on productivity is positive. A weaker
negative e¤ect of a recession on the long-term level of output implies higher
long-term output multipliers.
Fatas and Summers (2016a) nd that scal consolidations after the Great
Recession caused both a temporary loss in output and permanent damage to
potential output. Standard New Keynesian DSGE models are unable to ex-
plain permanent output losses, whereas our model can explain the persistent
or even permanent e¤ects of scal policy on potential output.
The idea that scal policy can a¤ect TFP is not new, but the dominant
view focuses exclusively on the consequences of the composition of public
spending and taxation on TFP growth in the long term (see Everaert et al.
2015 and IMF 2015). In a rare paper, Linnemann et al. (2016) analyze
the e¤ects of scal policy on productivity from a business-cycle perspective.
They nd that a positive public spending shock causes an increase in labor
productivity. They argue that their nding poses a real challenge to the scal
transmission mechanism embedded in most DSGE models: a rise in public
spending raises output and employment. If the production function includes
capital, which is predetermined in the short term, decreasing returns to labor
implies a fall in labor productivity. If the production function excludes capital
10According to Conference Board (2016) data and our calculations, shown in Figure 4,
the same ratio in the euro area in 2014 was 0.24.
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and is linear in labor, labor productivity remains constant.
When Linnemann et al. (2016) use a sign restriction to invoke a negative
correlation between output (or total hours worked) and labor productivity,
they nd a negative output response to a public spending shock. They argue
that either scal policy may indeed have negative e¤ects on output and em-
ployment or "the standard view of the scal transmission mechanism needs
to be augmented" (p. 13). We believe that the latter approach is right be-
cause virtually all studies nd a positive output response to scal shocks. As
mention in Section 2.2.1, TFP is equal to labor productivity in our model.
So, in our model, a rise in public spending also increases labor productivity.
Consequently, our production function with hysteresis seems to be a step into
a right direction. It can explain the positive response of labor productivity
to a rise in public spending.
Table 2 shows that the cumulative output multiplier is 0.9 in the pres-
ence of hysteresis. As mentioned, Ramey and Zubairy (2016) nd that most
estimates are in the range of 0.3 to 0.8. On the other hand, IMF (2012) nds
that the cumulative output multiplier of a positive spending shock in the
case of a negative output gap is 1.2. So our result is in the range of empirical
estimates that are relevant for the question at hand. Table 2 also shows that
the NPVM (2.9) is considerably greater than the cumulative multiplier (0.9).
Figure 3(j) illustrates that after 20 periods, public spending has, in prac-
tice, returned to zero. However, the di¤erence in domestic outputs, shown
in Figure 3(a), depending on whether public spending is increased or not, is
notable.
A typical argument against accommodative scal policy during and after
the Great Recession was that scal multipliers are low. Ramey and Zubairy
(2016) argue that if scal multipliers are below unity, they imply that scal
expansion does not stimulate private activity and that scal consolidation is
cannot do much harm to the private sector. The results of our paper suggest
that the main benet of scal expansion in a recession is to mitigate the
adverse consequences of a recession for the long-term level of output. Con-
sequently, the focus on short-term output multipliers as the main indicator
of the e¤ectiveness of scal policy in a recession may be misleading. In ad-
dition, Figure 3(b) shows that a rise in public spending  in the presence
of hysteresis increases private consumption in the medium and long term,
relative to the case without scal expansion. The crowding-out of private
consumption is a short-lived phenomenon.
Rendahl (2016) studies the e¤ectiveness of scal policy in a liquidity trap
using a model with persistent hysteresis-like movements in the unemploy-
ment rate. He nds that a rise in public spending lowers the unemployment
rate in the present and in the future. Therefore, the inuence of demand
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on aggregate supply through unemployment increases the scal output mul-
tiplier, which he nds to be in the range of 0.8 to 1.8. Our results are in
line with Rendahl (2016), but they hint that the inuence of demand on
aggregate supply through productivity seems to increase output multipliers
much more. The results of Reifschneider et al. (2015) and Anzoategui et
al. (2016) lead us to believe that endogenous changes in productivity are
the most important factor of hysteresis. Therefore, the results of Rendahl
(2016) may underestimate the e¤ectiveness of scal policy in the presence of
hysteresis.
In the presence of hysteresis, Table 2 shows that the welfare multiplier is
above 1, even if public spending is pure waste ( = 0). In the baseline case
( = 0:4), the welfare multiplier is 1.5, implying that one dollar spent by
the public raises domestic welfare by the equivalent of 1.5 dollars of private
consumption. An increase in domestic public spending reduces domestic
private consumption in the short term because of higher taxes. After a
while, the higher tax burden ends. As mentioned, a key benet of scal
expansion is that it limits the damage of a recession to long-term output.
Therefore, a rise in public spending increases domestic private consumption
relative to the case without scal expansion, as shown in Figure 3(b). The
positive e¤ect of scal expansion on private consumption in the medium and
long term explains the positive welfare multiplier.
Rendahl (2016) nds that the welfare multiplier is in the range of -0.4
and 0.7 in cases where public spending does not provide direct utility to
households. He shows that if the duration of a rise in public spending is
short, relative to the duration of liquidity trap, the welfare multipliers are
negative. In Section 4.4, we analyze the sensitivity of our welfare results with
respect to the persistence of a scal shock and nd di¤erent results.
Woodford (2011) shows the output multiplier in New Keynesian models
depends crucially on monetary policy. He shows that the output multiplier
can be well in excess of one at the zero lower bound. In this case, a rise
in public consumption, which provides direct utility to households, which
partially lls the output gap that arises from the inability to lower interest
rates, increases welfare, because it does not crowd out private consumption.
Bilbiie et al. (2014) nd that, when public spending does not provide direct
utility, expansionary scal policy is by and large welfare decreasing. Our
paper highlights that in the presence of hysteresis, scal expansion increases
welfare considerably, even if the central bank does not face the zero lower
bound.
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4.4 Robustness Checks
We now check the sensitivity of our main results to changes in key parameter
values. Table 3 presents the output and welfare multipliers in the presence
of hysteresis with row 1 replicating the baseline result. The second column
shows the parameters used in the sensitivity analysis and the respective values
of the baseline parameterization are shown in brackets.
Table 3: Varying Key Parameters in the Presence of Hysteresis
Row Parameter Cumul. NPVM Welfare Multiplier
multipl. ( = 0) ( = 0:4)
1 Baseline 0.9 2.9 1.1 1.5
2  = 0:06 (0:11) 0.7 1.9 0.2 0.6
3  = 0:15 (0:11) 1.1 3.8 1.8 2.2
4  = 0:96 (0:99) 0.9 1.5 -0.1 0.3
5  = 0:8 (0:99) 0.6 0.7 -0.9 -0.4
6 ' = 1:0 (0:5) 1.2 3.8 1.7 2
7  = 0:5 (0:75) 0.7 2.4 0.8 1.1
8  = 3:0 (1:5) 0.9 3.2 1.4 1.8
9 G = 0:6 (0:75) 1.1 3.2 1.3 1.6
Rows 2-5 show modications of the properties of the production func-
tion. In row 2, the elasticity of productivity with respect to employment,
, is reduced from the baseline value of 0.11 to 0.06. A lower value of 
implies a weaker e¤ect of employment changes on productivity. This reduces
the cumulative output multiplier from 0.9 to 0.7 and the NPVM from 2.9 to
1.9. The welfare multipliers fall strongly but remain positive. Thus, sizable
welfare e¤ects depend crucially on the strong linkage between employment
and productivity. However, Chang et al. (2002), using a Bayesian approach,
nd posterior estimates for  of 0.11 and 0.15. This suggests that for real-
istic values of , positive welfare multipliers and high output multipliers are
reasonable.
Row 3 shows multipliers in case where  is increased to 0.15. In this case,
the ratio of the peak decline in productivity to the peak decline in output
increases from 0.24 to 0.31. This is higher than the observed ratio during the
Great Recession in the U.S. (0.26). In addition, the ratio of the reduction in
output in the 20th period to the rst period output gap increases from 0.14
to 0.21 in the home country. As mentioned in Section 3, Rawdanowicz et al.
(2014) nd that this type of hysteresis parameter is 0.1 for the U.S. and 0.3
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for the euro area. They, however, calculate the hysteresis parameters for 32
countries and 25 of them show signs of hysteresis and the average, non-GDP-
weighted, hysteresis parameter in these 25 countries is as high as 0.5. So
our baseline parameterization may underestimate the size of the hysteresis
e¤ects after deep recessions.
The results in row 3 indicate that in case of  = 0:15, accommodative
scal policy has much larger benets than in the baseline case. Moreover,
the potential benets of scal policy are much larger than in the previous
literature that ignores the possibility of hysteresis. In our model, the NPVM
can be almost eightfold in the presence of hysteresis (3.8), compared with
the absence of it (0.5). Uhlig (2010) argues that scal policy has potentially
drastic long-term consequences. In his model a decit-nanced rise in public
spending stimulates output in the short term. The tax increases necessary to
repay the increased public debt then hamper the economy considerably. We
acknowledge that our models limitation is that taxes are non-distortionary.
Our model, however, shows that the potential long-term benets of accom-
modative scal policy during recessions can be substantial due to hysteresis
that is ignored in DSGE macroeconomics.
In the specications of rows 4 and 5, the persistence of the level of pro-
ductivity () is reduced to 0.96 and 0.8, respectively, from 0.99. The former
parameter value is used in Reifschneider et al. (2015). The latter value is
consistent with the estimate of Chang et al. (2002), who use micro-level data
from 1953-1997. It is, however, questionable whether the estimate of Chang
et al. (2002) is relevant for recessions. The assumption that  = 0:8 does not
generate a hysteresis-like response of output, because productivity converges
rapidly back to the initial steady state (0:820  0:01). This is inconsistent
with the empirical evidence showing that recessions have permanent or highly
persistent e¤ects on output.
A reduction in the persistence of productivity has a large e¤ect on welfare
multipliers. In fact, only in the case where  = 0:96 and  = 0:4 the welfare
multiplier remains positive; in other cases welfare multipliers turn negative.
A reduction in the persistence of productivity has a sizable e¤ect on NPVM,
and in the case of  = 0:8, it falls below one. The positive welfare multipliers
require that scal expansion limits the damage of a recession to the long-term
level of output to the extent that it crowds in private activity in the medium
and long term for a su¢ ciently long time. Therefore, we conclude that a high
persistence of productivity is needed for the positive welfare e¤ects that we
nd in our baseline case. A policy implication is that accommodative scal
policy only makes sense in an environment where the economy is subject to
hysteresis or hysteresis-like e¤ects.
22
Row 6 shows the multipliers when the Frisch elasticity of labor supply (')
is increased from 0.5 to the commonly used value of 1. Unsurprisingly, the
output and welfare multipliers both rise. The reason is the stronger response
of the labor supply to the increase in aggregate demand.
In row 7, the price rigidity parameter () is reduced from 0.75 to 0.5,
meaning that prices are changed on average once every two quarters rather
than once a year. The cumulative output multiplier and the net present value
multiplier fall slightly to 0.7 and 2.4, respectively, and the welfare multipliers
fall to the range of 0.8 to 1.1. The multipliers are reduced because the greater
price exibility brings about a faster adjustment to the steady state.
In international macroeconomics, transmission mechanisms are often quite
sensitive to the cross-country substitutability (). Feensta et al. (2014) nd
that it may be near unity in the U.S., but it could also be between 3 and 4.
In an alternative setup, presented in row 8, we increase  to 3. All multi-
pliers rise slightly because the terms of trade improvement causes a greater
consumption response after the shock.
In row 9, we present the e¤ects of a reduction in the persistence parame-
ter of the scal shock from 0.75 to 0.6. In our model, where the inuence of
demand on aggregate supply is modelled through productivity, we observe
a small increase in the output and welfare multipliers. This is opposite to
the result of Rendahls (2016) model that has hysteresis-like movements in
the unemployment rate. He nds that the welfare multipliers turn negative
in the case where the duration of a rise in public spending is short, rela-
tive to the duration of the zero lower bound. In our model, a key benet
of scal expansion is that it limits the permanent damage of a recession to
productivity in the short term. A short-lived scal expansion seems to cause
a bigger bang for the buck, because it mitigates the permanent fall in pro-
ductivity and output the most e¤ectively. This gives some support for the
view that scal stimulus should beas often arguedtimely and temporary.
On the other hand, the output multipliers are very high, even if the duration
of a scal shock is high.
5 Conclusions for Economic Policy
Several empirical studies (including Ball 2014, Blanchard et al. 2015, Martin
2015) nd evidence for the hysteresis hypothesis, according to which reces-
sions have permanent e¤ects on the level of output. The relationship be-
tween recessions and the equilibrium level of output is inadequately modeled
in DSGE macroeconomics. We presented a DSGE model that incorporates
a link between economic activity and potential output. Furthermore, Fatas
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and Summers (2016a) show that post-Great Recession scal consolidations
have induced permanent damage to potential output. Fatas and Summers
(2016b) and Yellen (2016) argue that hysteresis can change the way econo-
mists think about the conduct of scal policy. Therefore, we analyze the
implications of hysteresis for scal policy.
Our results suggest that the detrimental e¤ects of scal consolidation
in weak economic conditions, where hysteresis is relevant, are considerable.
Gechert et al. (2015) estimate that cumulative discretionary scal consolida-
tion measures in the euro area between 2011 and 2013 were 3.9% of output
(2% in 2011; 1.3% in 2012 and 0.6% in 2013). This estimate of the size
of scal consolidation and our results regarding cumulative output multipli-
ers and the e¤ects on TFP imply that the euro areas scal consolidation
reduced output and TFP by 2.8% and 0.6%, respectively, relative to the
no-consolidation baseline by 2013.
Fiscal consolidation was likely a key factor to the euro areas recession
during the 2010s. Figure 4 on page 32 shows that TFP fell in the recession of
the 2010s and it was 1.1% below trend in 2013.11 Accordingly, scal consoli-
dation may explain roughly half of the fall in TFP in 2011-2013. Hysteresis,
however, implies that the damage of the euro areas scal consolidation is not
limited to the short term because of its substantial medium- and long-term
e¤ects. Our cumulative output multipliers imply that the euro areas scal
consolidation of 2011-2013 will cause output losses of 6.8% relative to the
no-consolidation baseline by 2020. In addition, it will still, according to our
results, reduce the potential level of output in 2020 by 0.6% due to its detri-
mental e¤ects on productivity. Moreover, our benchmark parameterization
may underestimate the costs of the euro areas scal consolidation, because
it implies a much smaller extent of hysteresis (0.14) than Rawdanowicz et al.
(2014) nd for the euro area (0.3).
Furman (2016) summarizes that the new view of scal policy is that dis-
cretionary scal policy can be a useful complement to monetary policy in a
world with low interest rates that limit conventional monetary policy. Reif-
schneider et al. (2015) study the implications of hysteresis for the conduct
of monetary policy and nd that optimal monetary policy becomes more ac-
commodative when the economy is subject to hysteresis e¤ects that policy
can mitigate. Our ndings suggest that accommodative scal policy becomes
desirableeven in recessions where the central bank does not face the zero
lower boundwhen the economy is subject to hysteresis e¤ects; accommoda-
11Data are from the Conference Boards (2016) total economy database. The euro area
GDP and TFP were aggregated for the original 11 euro area countries (i.e. excluding
Greece). The (slightly) time varying country weights were calculated as GDP weights
based on constant price GDP in 1990 US-Dollars (converted at Geary Khamis PPPs).
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tive scal policy is not desirable in the absence of hysteresis due to negative
welfare multipliers. Our ndings and those of Reifschneider et al. (2015)
indicate that hysteresis has more profound implications for the conduct of
scal policy than to monetary policy. Overall our results support the view
of Yellen (2016), according to which, "hysteresis would seem to make it even
more important for policymakers to act quickly and aggressively in response
to a recession, because doing so would help to reduce the depth and persis-
tence of the downturn, thereby limiting the supply-side damage that might
otherwise ensue."
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Figure 1: Total factor productivity and GDP in the U.S. (indexes 2007=100),
and their projections based on 1990-2007 trend, source: Conference Board
(2016)
Figure 2: Dynamic responses to a foreign time preference shock without
hysteresis
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Figure 3: Dynamic responses to a foreign time preference shock in the pres-
ence of hysteresis
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Figure 4: Total factor productivity and GDP in the euro area (indexes
2008=100), and their projections based on 1990-2008 trend, source: Con-
ference Board (2016)
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